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Abstract
Background: Patients who present to medical practices without health insurance or with serious
co-morbidities can become fiscal disasters to those who care for them. Their consumption of
scarce resources has caused consternation among providers and institutions, especially as it
concerns the amount and type of care they should receive. In fact, some providers may try to avoid
caring for them altogether, or at least try to limit their institutional or practice exposure to them.
Discussion: We present a philosophical discourse, with emphasis on the writings of Immanuel
Kant and G.F.W. Hegel, as to why physicians have the moral imperative to give such "outliers"
considerate and thoughtful care. Outliers are defined and the ideals of morality, responsibility, good
will, duty, and principle are applied to the care of patients whose financial means are meager and
to those whose care is physiologically futile. Actions of moral worth, unconditional good will, and
doing what is right are examined.
Summary: Outliers are a legitimate economic concern to individual practitioners and institutions,
however this should not lead to an evasion of care. These patients should be identified early in their
course of care, but such identification should be preceded by a well-planned recognition of this
burden and appropriate staffing and funding should be secured. A thoughtful team approach by
medical practices and their institutions, involving both clinicians and non-clinicians, should be
pursued.
Background
Health care providers (and hospitals) in the United States
struggle with the costs of health care delivery on a daily
basis, frequently facing the daunting prospect of accepting
uninsured or under-insured patients with significant co-
morbidities. Such co-morbidities may result in a pro-
longed length of stay far exceeding any prospective pay-
ment scheme (Diagnosis Related Groups [DRGs] and
capitation). DRGs are a classification of hospital case
types into groups based on diagnoses, procedures, age, sex
and the presence of complications or comorbidities that
are expected to have similar hospital resource use. Federal
health care programs use this classification to pay for
inpatient hospital care. Capitation is the system of pay-
ment for each customer served, rather than by service per-
formed. For example, the heart transplant patient who is
three years post transplant who now presents with a regur-
gitant tricuspid valve in his transplanted heart that is in
need of repair or replacement may be insured, but he is an
extreme challenge physiologically and administratively.
He will most likely exceed the average length of stay for
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valve replacement and become an "outlier", the driving
force behind hospital costs.
Physicians, and the institutions in which they practice,
have tried to control personnel costs, technology costs,
and pharmacy costs, but outliers have been beyond their
grasp. This small population of patients is a mega-con-
sumer of resources. The futility of their care, the likeli-
hood of poor outcomes, and the overuse of technology
and therapeutic modalities in these patients are a subset of
issues in the approach to outlier management as opposed
to the primary ethical issue of engaging them as patients
in medical practices and institutions [1].
Struggles with obligation regarding the care of outliers
consume the consciousness of many health care provid-
ers, including the authors. Morality, responsibility, good
will, duty, acting on principle, justice, and treating people
as an end in themselves, as viewed by the authors and sup-
ported by the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and G.F.W.
Hegel, are explored as a basis for a physician to never dis-
engage from the care of outliers.
From the vantage point of pure reason Kant's Categorical
Imperative directs one as to what ought to be done. It is
considered "categorical" because it is not dependent on
the senses and its value is always overriding. The require-
ment of duty is expressed by reason. To follow this imper-
ative we must act according to the maxims that are willed
to be universal laws. In doing so we determine our action
freely and we accept a principle determined by pure rea-
son. Thus, the law we follow is ours and we are autono-
mous [2]. In other words, as physicians we have a capacity
for intentional action and, ideally, we act independent of
controlling influences to provide our patients with care
based upon the best decisions that we can make while act-
ing "freely" and "purely".
Kant then proceeds to instruct us that we are rational
beings (agents whose value is not based on external mate-
riality) and in accepting the categorical imperative we are
governed by the laws of reason, not nature. In this way we
can will the world to become a place of different rational
beings living together, obeying laws, and showing respect
for all [2]. In doing so we respect the autonomy of the
patient and their family. It is our professional obligation
to help them make autonomous choices and to respect
their choices. We cannot do this if we disengage from their
care.
Kant teaches that there is one morality, but different types
of duties. He makes the distinction between strict duties
and imperfect (as opposed to perfect) duties. Strict duties
involve justice, such as respecting the rights of others and
not violating the dignity of others. A perfect duty requires
a specific action, such as keeping a promise. An imperfect
duty, such as helping others, cannot be demanded as a
right by someone else, so there is leeway as to how this
right should be respected [2]. All three types of duties
encompass a medical practice. A strict duty involving dig-
nity and rights, as mentioned above, is a duty most physi-
cian organizations would consider inviolate and demand
that their members respect such a duty. However, per-
formance of perfect and imperfect duties is more difficult
to secure from an individual. It is the moral physician
who can go beyond strict duties and engage the patient in
perfect and imperfect duties, as the situation requires.
Kant felt that as man's knowledge grew, man would
understand his relative insignificance in the universe, but
at the same time such awareness would allow the moral
law within him to expand. Thus, as moral beings with infi-
nite value, we would realize the significance and dignity of
our position in the cosmos. In having such an infinite
value, those of us who become medical "outliers" would
deserve attention, consideration, and thoughtful evalua-
tion.
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, which he published during a
national political crisis in Prussia in 1821, was drawn
upon, in part, to support our maxim. Even though Hegel
advanced claims antagonistic to the individual, self-
aware/conscious subject in his work, we found certain
thoughts he expressed to conform to aspects of our
maxim.
As we become self-aware creatures we acquire personality
and with personality we can change our physical environ-
ment, thus encountering "will". We are thus distinct from
nature ("I am I"). Personality essentially involves the
capacity for "rights". Hegel goes on to develop the imper-
ative of right, i.e., people have rights that should not be
infringed upon. Thus, having a will, and being conscious
of that will, allows our self to surface through choice and
action [3,4]. The "right" to health care does not exist in all
societies, but an argument can be made that a patient
being cared for by a physician has the "right" to expect the
physician will not withdraw from their care.
Hegel allows some instruction in private property and
contracts and explains to us how several people looking
upon a "thing" as theirs would lead to the clash of one
man's right with that of another man [4]. It is not unrea-
sonable that patients would consider their relationship
with a physician as a "thing" to which they have a right
and that a "clash" could occur if the physician attempted
to disengage from the care of the patient.
Hegel then moves on to morality, a requirement of self.
He feels morality is an "ought to be or demand". OurBMC Medical Ethics 2004, 5 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/5/3
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"selves" are incomplete without the demand of moral law,
in other words, the self needs a purpose, and Hegel feels
that purpose is to become the embodiment of law. This
moral law involves "this identity of my will with the will
of others". Here we start to lose our individuality and
become conforming social beings. The moral action of a
social being is concerned with their own welfare and that
of all others. Welfare is identified with the "good" and the
"good" is "the absolute end of will" [5]. The question
arises as to what physical and financial effort is an individ-
ual worth from the societal perspective as it regards their
health care. What is "too much effort" by society or by the
individual medical practitioner?
Up to this point both Kant and Hegel advance our maxim.
However, at this juncture Kant would believe that pure
reason could determine right and good, but Hegel would
probably differ. According to Hegel a person has a right to
only "listen to reason". Here Hegel's social being comes
into play at the expense of Kant's "form" of moral will
which has applications of universality.
Hegel proceeds to take his social being into the ethical life
of valid laws and institutions, such as marriage, family,
civil society, and the state. He feels these laws and institu-
tions of society are binding on the individual will. When
one is a member of a family there is no dependence, only
membership. Personality or individuality is expressed
through the family entity. The family and its individuals
are then integrated with civil society (the economic level).
Civil society is part of the state (political level) and the
state "has supreme right against the individual, whose
supreme duty is to be a member of the state" [6]. The
problem of morality the "self" faced in the abstract is now
replaced with duties the individual must fulfill in society
to remain virtuous. We have now gone from the abstract
to the specific. Society now identifies or defines the uni-
versal will and the individual has the duty to perform and
conform [6].
Even though a society will try to honor strict duties, such
a justice, from the health care vantage point of the medical
outlier, perfect duties (keeping a promise) and imperfect
duties (helping others) now are subject to a societal and
political will. The members of society can influence this
will, for or against medical outliers. Regardless of the "pre-
vailing winds" of opinion, physicians must strive to do
what is in the best interests of their patients.
Hegel's views of morality and social ethics have important
implications. He felt that when considering morality right
and wrong was a matter of individual conscience. How-
ever, he also indicated to us that man must move beyond
individual morality to the level of social ethics. For Hegel
duty was not an individual judgment, but only occurred
in the context of social relationships. In the end, though,
the issues of futility of care and resource allocation cannot
be ignored and must be addressed as they concern the
welfare of all.
The works of Kant and Hegel uniquely contribute to issues
involving medical ethics. Kant's use of reason, pure rea-
son, can be very appealing to those physicians who carry
the Hellenistic "ideal" of medicine to their practice. His
view on the good will, responsibility, duty, morality, act-
ing on principle, justice, and persons as ends in them-
selves are very seductive to the idealistic physician.
Even though Hegel demanded sublimation of the individ-
ual to the family, civil society and the state, his views on
self, personality, capacity for rights, right and wrong,
morality, welfare and the conscience lend themselves to
our maxim. His positions on the family, civil society, and
the State may be leveraged against this sublimation of the
individual if (1) doing what is best for a minority of indi-
viduals (medical outliers) morally strengthens the family,
society and the State, and if (2) that burden of medical
outliers (financial and otherwise) is borne by the entirety
of a moral society. The views of Hegel may thus be com-
patible with Kant in supporting our maxim.
Discussion
What is an outlier?
During our graduate work an outlier was a point on a
graph that was more than two standard deviations away
from the midpoint of a normal distribution. According to
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary an outlier is "an
observation so distant from the central mass of data that
it is considered an obvious mistake that should be
removed from the data whether or not a cause of the devi-
ation can be found" [7]. Later, as practitioners of the heal-
ing arts, we discovered that we could be outliers if we
consumed too many of a hospital's resources. Thus, our
conceptualization of an outlier progresses from the
abstract to the personal.
Hospitals may even become outliers if their adjusted mor-
tality rates exceed the norms. Adjusted mortality rates, of
course, may not be a reliable screening tool to determine
the outlier status of a hospital [8]. Hospitals are not per-
sons and there is little emotional context when looking at
them as outliers.
However, the dilemma of patients as outliers presents a
moral conundrum. They are neither points on a graph,
nor can they be chastised economically for their illness or
socioeconomic status. A patient can be an outlier if admit-
ted to a low-volume, high variation, DRG. This inherent
variability in such patients causes a financial risk to the
institution to which they are admitted, and, in turn, hos-BMC Medical Ethics 2004, 5 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/5/3
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pitals' excessive claims for outlier payments may put the
state at risk, i.e., the upsetting of Medicare regulation in
America [9,10].
Such patients are also outliers if their lengths of stay
exceed the mean by 20 days or 1.94 standard deviations,
whichever is less [11]. Even if the length of stay is within
accepted bounds, the patient can be deemed an outlier
because of increased resource utilization [12].
This definition can further be refined using basic, auto-
mated, routinely gathered laboratory data to help "the dis-
criminatory power of risk models based on administrative
data with abstracted diagnoses" [13]. Adding laboratory
data to the analysis can improve an administration's abil-
ity to identify providers with possible exceptional quality
of care. This model allows identification of "outlier"
wards.
Patients as outliers seem to present in two ways. They are
either identified before admission or after. In the first case,
they are recognized as potential outliers before admission
because of their co-morbidities or financial status/health
insurance and are identified as likely to be a financial bur-
den upon the institution. The moral imperative of their
situation drives most physicians to care for them, but
those same physicians and the hospital administrators
with whom they work realize the potential fiscal dilemma
that these patients present.
In the second case, the patient is already hospitalized and
his illness has caused an unexpected, protracted length of
stay with no end in sight. A transplant patient receiving
immunosuppressive therapy presenting for a major sur-
gery may be such an example. The immunosuppressive
drugs are necessary for the continued viability of the trans-
plant, but these medications do not allow the patient's
new wound to heal. Infections may occur; the patient may
become septic, but does not die. He marginally exists on
the ventilator with a tracheotomy, receives renal dialysis
for his now failing kidneys, antibiotics for sepsis, invasive
monitors, expensive nutritional formulas, and multiple
debridements of his wound or other surgical procedures.
His care is now greater than 90 intensive care days and life
support is not withdrawn because he is cognitively intact.
These two types of outliers generally result in one of the
following clinical outcomes: 1) they die after prolonged
hospital stays; 2) they survive hospitalizations, only to die
soon after being discharged or if they survive, never
recover their pre-hospital function; or 3) they survive the
hospitalization and return to their pre-hospitalization
functional status [14].
An outlier, in this context, is a human being who suffers
an incredible physiologic, emotional, and financial bur-
den; who, in turn, will cause health care providers and
administrators economic and psychological stress. An
outlier can be recognized, an outlier will cost money, and
an outlier will tax emotions. Why stay engaged in their
care?
Morality
All physicians like to think of themselves as "moral" indi-
viduals. Morality is something required and demanded by
the "self" [15]. It is something that universally "ought to
be". There is a universal conception of how a physician
should respond to a patient (one who suffers). "Hurt no
one; rather help all as much as you can" is the basic moral
premise with which many moral philosophers agree [16].
Moral law requires moral demands and our inability to
meet all such moral demands indicates that our "self " is
incomplete. To compensate for our incompleteness as
moral physicians we seek purpose or aim. This notion of
aim allows us to try to become what we "ought" to be, to
aspire "to become the actual, objective embodiment of
what ought to be" [15].
This moral law and the physician's response to it should
be a "universal" response; its moral essence should be
applicable to all practitioners. The physician should meld
reason and moral essence with social welfare and enter the
moral corridor where a physician's aim is to identify his or
her will with the will of the patient. The physician tries to
positively influence the will of others (family and civil
society) to the benefit of the patient and represents the
will of the patient to other health care providers, the
patient's family, and to civil society/the state.
According to Hegel, moral action has a special context.
That context is welfare, not only an individual's welfare,
but also the welfare of all. Moral action improving the
welfare of the individual and the whole is a "good"; there-
fore, "welfare" and "good" become synonymous. To
know the "good" means subjugation of individual will,
and to understand that morality demands realization of
the good, the universal welfare of all [15]. The universal
welfare requires the care of outliers by the moral physi-
cian.
Responsibility
Physicians are morally responsible for the care of outliers,
as individual practitioners and as a collective. This respon-
sibility can only be evaded if four conditions are met,
which would be morally, ethically, and intellectually
incompatible with being a moral physician.
First, the evasive physician would claim only to be respon-
sible for only the effects of those aspects of care of which
he or she was conscious. For example, the physicianBMC Medical Ethics 2004, 5 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/5/3
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ordered a blood transfusion and it happened to be con-
taminated with bacteria that resulted in the patient's
death. He was not responsible because he had no way of
knowing that the blood was contaminated. Physicians
may subconsciously delude themselves that their patient
will not be an outlier or will find medical insurance
(through "the government") and thus deny responsibility
for admitting an outlier to the hospital [15].
Second, the evasive physician could claim that he is not
responsible because all actions can lead to varied out-
comes, not all of which can be foreseen, and that other
causal factors intruded to give the patient a bad outcome.
This can only be claimed when best practices are followed.
Not providing the best or appropriate care for a patient
with severe co-morbidities or lack of health insurance
leads to only one consequence; poor outcomes and the
suffering of patients and their families [15].
Third, the evasive physician claims responsibility only for
those aspects of their actions that they willed or intended
to produce. This claim is simply foolish. Physicians intend
many good things, but are actually responsible for varied
consequences, even if the consequences are unintended.
An errant ball may break a window at a sandlot soccer
game. The player did not intend this, but is still responsi-
ble [15].
Fourth, the evasive physician must deny that "the value of
an action lies in its objective end, what it accomplishes in
the external world of fact (good care of the patient); its
value does not lie in the subjective satisfactions a physi-
cian derives from achieving his or her ends" [15]. There is
no getting around this statement. If a physician does not
provide care for an outlier this inaction will speak to the
external world clearly. He may be satisfied that he has
avoided work or risk, but such inaction does not have
external value.
None of the above mentioned four conditions can be
voided by the moral physician. Therefore, the moral phy-
sician has responsibility. Such an argument can be extended
to other health professionals and administrators.
Good Will
A moral physician must exhibit good will, an uncondi-
tional "good". A good will is the only thing good without
qualification,
"It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world,
or even out of it, which can be taken as good without
qualification, except a "good will" [17].
Such a "good" cannot be tarnished because it has uncon-
ditional worth. In the outlier such a good will may not be
effective enough to cure the person, it may amount to lit-
tle success, but "even then it would shine like a jewel for
its own sake as something which has its full value in itself"
[17]. Human beings are, for the most part, rational and
have the power to reason. This power to reason influences
the will because,
"its true function must be to produce a will which is good,
not as a means to some further end, but in itself" [17].
If moral principle (see below) motivates a physician's will
it is always and necessarily good. Physicians must control
their moral status; it is the distinctive expression of their
humanity. By controlling our will, "goodness" will only
depend on us. Therefore, our attitude greatly influences
our moral character. We have the ability to reason so that
we can produce the best of "goods" as physicians, the
good will, and in so doing, unconditionally provide it to
an outlier.
Duty
Performing our duty can sometimes be difficult. Reason
demands that we do what is right, but our desire can inter-
fere with what we ought to do. We may not really desire to
take care of those who cannot pay and we do not really
desire to take care of a ventilator-dependent patient for
weeks on end, but Kant places duty at the center of a
moral life. We must free ourselves from the desire not to
engage such patients if we are to lead a moral life. This
kind of conflict between reason and desire obviously does
not occur at all times in the care of outliers. Many times
we find that our desires to overcome challenges and our
duty are congruent and it is easy to do our duty. However,
Kant cautions us,
"that we should not be fooled by an occasional coinci-
dence of inclination and duty into thinking that warm
feelings for others bestow moral worth on our actions.
Nor is it enough to act in accordance with duty, from what-
ever motive, in order for our behavior to have moral
worth. Helping our neighbor is required by duty, but
helping our neighbor has no moral worth if done out of
an inclination to help others. Moral worth is achieved only
if we act from duty, that is to say, only if we act out of an
appreciation of the fact that the act is our duty" [17].
In order for a physician's good will to have moral worth it
must spring forth from duty. We frequently feel sorry for
our patients. Yet this motivation does not spring from
duty. There are two reasons as to why sympathy cannot
bestow moral worth on a deed. First, the physician may
have sympathy for someone who does not deserve it, but
in turn not exhibit sympathy for someone who does
deserve it. Sympathy is an inclination and all inclinations
are unreliable as vectors for moral actions. In the secondBMC Medical Ethics 2004, 5 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/5/3
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case, sympathy lacks moral content. If you treat a patient
out of sympathy your are satisfying an internal need rather
than an external good, and not doing something that is of
moral value. Therefore, only the motive of duty bestows
moral worth on an action [5].
Evidence of moral worth in doing our duty is most clear
when physicians and other health care professionals are
not inclined to do their duty because it costs them time or
money, but do so nevertheless. Taking care of outliers is
something many providers and institutions do not like, or
even have to do, but in doing so provide society with an
example of "beneficent action having moral worth " [5].
Principle
What is the motive of a morally worthy action? Moral
worth depends "on the principle of volition in accordance
with which, irrespective of all objects of the faculty of
desire, the action has been performed" [17]. The purpose
and goals of our actions are not what is important. Moral
worth is bestowed on physicians and their interactions
with patients because principle is motivating them. This is
a further elucidation of the "good will." The moral physi-
cian will act out of a sense of duty when he or she acts on
principle. Principle makes us do what we ought to do
(duty).
As physicians and health care professionals we must lead
the moral life, i.e., the life of principle. The moral person
is the one who is principled. A principled person does the
right thing out of reason and the general consideration of
how a human being should act. Principle places moral
worth on the action and thereby on the physician or
health care professional.
Justice
Medical outliers are due justice. Kant states that, "Any
action is just if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
accordance with a universal law" [18]. In other words, an
action is just if it respects the freedom of others, and does
so not accidentally, but on principle. Every action must
respect the freedom of every individual [19].
Kant feels that freedom is a natural right, "Freedom, in so
far as it is can coexist with the freedom of every other in
accordance with a universal law, is the only original right
belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity" [18].
Kant is now taking the path toward human rights. The
right to which he refers is universal and cannot be sub-
orned by legislation or budget limitations.
Of course physicians are also due justice. It is difficult to
force an individual to care for another against their will.
However, if a patient or their family wishes to engage in
an attempt at preserving their life or that of a loved one,
the opportunity to make such an effort cannot be cur-
tailed in a moral or ethical society. It can be argued that
monetary funds are limited, but is help from a physician
limited? Where do virtue and morality come into focus?
Must virtue and morality be subject only to remunera-
tion? Is there not some special covenant in accepting the
mantle of being a physician? These questions can be
debated, but not legislated, and the answers (views) will
vary from physician to physician.
If no one attends to medical outliers they, or their fami-
lies, may consider themselves as being wronged, i.e., not
receiving justice. Hegel's views on coercion and crime may
be appropriate to the discussion at this time. It is true that
the concept of medical outliers, transplantation medicine,
and extended length of stay were unknown to Hegel, but
some of his thoughts may be applicable.
Hegel claims, "the free will cannot be coerced at all" [4],
but goes on to say, "only the will which allows itself to be
coerced can in any way be coerced" [4]. If you or loved
one lay dying how can one not feel coercion if another
party (the physician or a hospital) is trying to withdraw or
not attend to the patient? Force or coercion is in its very
conception directly self-destructive [4]. Furthermore,
"Wrong in the full sense of the word is crime, where there
is no respect either for the principle or rightness or for
what seems right to me, where, then, both sides, the objec-
tive and subjective, are infringed" [20].
If a patient is in an emergency department, hospital room,
or in a physician's office the practitioner will be hard-
pressed to be considered just if (a) he or she does not care
for the patient or (b) does not find another physician to
care for the patient (and in such situations in America the
physician may actually be committing a tort, i.e., a civil
rather than criminal wrong for which the law provides a
remedy) [21].
Hegel makes reference to contracts in regard to possession
of property, but an extension of this thinking, as is pro-
vided in the preceding paragraph, can be recognized in
American courts today as a contract. When a physician or
a practitioner in his or her employ encounters any patient
this may result in a contract, or covenant, i.e., a common
will [19].
Accordingly, "The covenant, made manifest in a symbol
[the patient encounter-our interpretation], and its perform-
ance (the particular will) are quite distinct" [20], but, "in
a contract, to be sure, making a covenant entails the right
to require its performance" [20]. Ergo, there is a require-
ment of justice for the medical outlier.BMC Medical Ethics 2004, 5 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/5/3
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Outliers exist as an end-in-themselves
Our patients who are outliers must never be treated just as
things, black holes, or expensive DRGs. They are people
who have an absolute worth in themselves. Kant would
agree:
"Now I say that man, and in general every rational being,
exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbi-
trary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions,
whether they are directed to himself or to other rational
beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end" [italics
added by authors] [17].
R.L. Arrington helps us interpret Kant further by stating
that,
"Each of us is a person, not just a thing to be used, a means
to someone else's pleasure or well-being, and our person-
hood consists in our status as a rational agent of worth. All
persons qua rational agents have unconditioned value in
themselves as ends – such is the pronouncement of reason
and morality" [5].
The old maxim of "do unto others as you would have
them do unto you" is very appropriate here. Whatever we
think is right for us, as providers, is also right for all other
rational creatures, including outliers. Whatever we ask
others to do, we must be willing to do ourselves. It is uni-
versal that we:
"Act only on that maxim through which you can at the
same time will that it should become a universal law"
[17].
Kant, and the authors, feel that as principled providers of
health care, the duty to help (outliers) is imposed on us
not only in acknowledging that our patients are worthy
ends in themselves, but that we should also advance their
ends. Honoring these duties brings merit upon us.
The state, futility of care, and the welfare of all
As physicians we express concern about the individual
patient and we tend to be patient advocates. Kant's ideas
about morality, duty, obligation, principle, etc. easily
meld into the daily practice of western medicine as it
applies to the individual.
Hegel, though, has historically been conceptually more
difficult in regard to supporting the individual as it con-
cerns the welfare of all, futility of care, and the govern-
ment's place in such topics.
"The state has the supreme right against the individual,
whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state" [6].
This is quite a formidable statement on Hegel's part. Espe-
cially when thoughts such as, "The rational end of man is
life in the state" [20], and "Permission to enter or leave it
must be given by the state" [20], and finally, "Hence if the
state claims life, the individual must surrender it" [20] are
offered in support of individual sublimation to the state.
These statements are made in a political context, but
nonetheless are implied threats to the individual who uses
scarce resources. So one may flippantly ask why are not
medical outliers justified in ending their existence them-
selves? Hegel's initial response to such an interrogative is,
"But as for an unqualified right to suicide, we must simply
say that there is no such thing, even for heroes" [20].
Hegel explains himself further as he addresses notions of
"property" in relation to living:
"There is therefore no unqualified right to sacrifice one's
life. To such a sacrifice nothing is entitled except an ethical
Idea as that in which this immediately single personality
has vanished and to whose power it is actually subjected.
Just as life as such is immediate, so death is its immediate
negation and hence must come from without, either by
natural causes, or else, in the service of the Idea, by the
hand of a foreigner" [20].
Of course Hegel was never confronted with the topics of
palliative care and euthanasia (ending of life at the request
of the medical outlier, not the state). His feelings on sui-
cide probably refer to the able-bodied citizens of the state
who are of use to the state. From the patient's perspective
he seems to allow an argument of self-determination
when he states, "I possess the members of my body, my
life, only so long as I will to possess them" [20]. Nonethe-
less, some sort of process should be available to address
care alternatives for the individual.
Should the state care what its citizens think about medical
outliers? Should how the public feels about medical out-
liers influence a government's position? Hegel says,
"Public opinion, therefore, is a repository not only of the
genuine needs and correct tendencies of common life, but
also, in form of common sense (i.e., all-pervasive funda-
mental ethical principles disguised as prejudices), of the
eternal, substantive principles of justice, the time content
and result of legislation, the whole constitution, and the
general position of the state" [20].
Public opinion is the collective will of individuals and
may result in formulation of a general position of the state
(at least in a free society) in regard to medical outliers. A
citizen's will counts in such a society. The will of many
individuals becomes a collective will. If that collective will
is the majority in a free society, and if that collective will
can persevere and endure, it will become the position ofBMC Medical Ethics 2004, 5 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/5/3
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the government. The government's will, therefore, is the
will of the people.
As an example, the number of aged Americans will be an
increasingly significant portion of the population. They
can potentially be an enormous collective will. This aging
population will have assets and voting power. Inculcated
into this population is a conscious history of the authors'
maxim (which has been the traditional position in the
United States). If the people who form the collective will
can imagine themselves as medical outliers, and many of
them do so (catastrophic medical insurance is being
bought by an increasing number of individuals), this col-
lective will may be found to be congruent with that of the
individual.
This population will expect engagement of their physician
in their care, regardless of the expiration of hospital care
eligibility or government resources. In the event of eco-
nomic scarcity this population will not only hope for sup-
port from their family, but they will expect their physician
to be their advocate and guide them and their family
through waters that are difficult to navigate. The physician
may very well become the "negotiator" of health care. The
physician's continued engagement with patients will be
paramount.
An emphasis placed on "never disengaging" from the care
of outliers is consequently followed by a myriad of ques-
tions regarding futile care. Resource allocation is a prob-
lem confronting the "engaged" outlier and his health care
providers. While posing the question of how to make a
fair decision in allocation of scarce resources is inevitable,
it is beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to say
that such decisions in regard to allocation of resources
occur simultaneously at the governmental, hospital, and
bedside levels along with evidence-based medicine and
benefit analysis. Dr. Peter A. Singer, of the University of
Toronto, explains that "decisions over resource allocation
can be mitigated through three general strategies: 1) don't
do things that don't work; 2) don't do things that do work,
but the patients don't want done; and 3) don't do things
inefficiently" [22].
Health care providers are left with five questions that need
to be answered in regard to allocation of scarce medical
resources:
1. How much should we favor producing the best out-
come with our limited resources?
2. When should we allow the aggregation of modest ben-
efits to more people to outweigh more substantial bene-
fits to fewer people?
3. How much priority should we give to treating the sick-
est or most disabled patients?
4. When must we rely on fair democratic process as the
only way to determine what constitutes a fair rationing
policy?
5. When resources are limited, should we fund a program
where there is high-quality evidence of a small benefit or
one where there is lower-quality evidence of a large bene-
fit [22]?
While it is the physician's duty to care for an outlier, the
constraints of societal and organizational allocation of
resources may affect the physician's level of intervention
and "engagement." Futile care need not be provided
because it does not benefit the patient. We have to be care-
ful that our internal desire to control/allocate resources
does not intrude on our determination of benefit; at the
same time we must realize that serious consideration of
futile end-of-life care does not generally receive enough
attention [23,24].
Conclusion
Patients who become outliers in the physiologic or eco-
nomic sense present legitimate concerns to health care
providers, insurers, institutions, and health care systems.
These concerns should not be translated into a plan for
evasion of their care, but should result in a well-planned
approach to staffing, securing of funding, and locating
alternative funding sources for these patients. Identifying
outliers early in the admissions process may lead to later
facilitation of their care. When unanticipated complica-
tions arise during the care of patient it would be prudent
to develop a team approach to that individual early in the
course of care using the experience of other physicians,
nurses, allied health care professionals and administrators
to help resolve the difficulties that will most definitely
ensue. This team approach, or provision of an infrastruc-
ture dealing with outlier management, is important so
that ethical conflicts rarely occur. The approach should
focus on patients and their loved ones to provide guid-
ance and understanding regarding the clinical course and
potential outcome of the illness, thus avoiding potential
ethical dilemmas between the physician's duty to outliers
and the duty to society via the allocation of health care
resources. Duty and principle command us to provide
care to outliers. The health care community bears moral
responsibility for the care of all citizens.
An idealistic argument has just been made, on behalf of
our patients, which carries the moral strength of a hurri-
cane, but the economic strength of a summer breeze.
Rational and adequate planning and funding are neces-
sary for the task at hand, however the question of futileBMC Medical Ethics 2004, 5 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/5/3
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care and use of scarce resources is daunting. Cooperation
among private and public sectors, profit and not-for-profit
organizations, labor, religion, and academic entities is
paramount.
In the end our actions as moral agents are what count. We
must always remain principled, demonstrate "good will",
act responsibly out of duty, and treat patients as an end-
in-themselves.
Summary
Patients who are outliers are a legitimate economic con-
cern of health practitioners and medical institutions. Eva-
sion of the care of outliers is not morally acceptable.
Physicians, because of their training and position in soci-
ety to heal, must remain moral agents who stand and
deliver that which is needed by outliers. Such a view is ide-
alistic and structuring it into medical practices and hospi-
tal settings with existing reimbursement systems and
scarce resources, especially with an aging population and
new technologies, must be acknowledged as difficult.
The debate presented here, in which physicians are char-
acterized as moral agents, is not naïve. The problem is
real. The views of Kant and Hegel, although seemingly
incompatible, are precisely the two "opposite" poles that
must be reconciled, i.e., a synthesis of the moral obliga-
tion of individuals, institutions, and society to each other
while considering the welfare of all.
Such a tasking recognizes that: (1) the inevitable entrance
of such patients into medical practices and institutions is
burdensome economically and psychologically, (2) a
"team" approach involving clinicians and administrators
is needed to identify medical outliers upon their initial
presentation so as to coordinate their support, and (3)
simply making budget adjustments and seeking more
support (monetary and otherwise) may not be enough. A
collective electoral "will" may be necessary to determine
how much of a state's wealth should be available to
medial outliers.
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